



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Losskij's article is on the whole sensible; it is strongly realistic in tone, and rather astonishes me by the naïveté, not of its realism, but of the belief that its realism is new. It certainly throws no light on the problems that have been familiar to other people of the same way of thinking (*e. g.*, Russell and Meinong) for years past.

C. D. BROAD.

The University, St. Andrews.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF IMMANUEL KANT. By A. D. Lindsay, M.A.
London and Edinburgh: T. C. & E. C. Jack, 1913. Pp. 89.
(The People's Books Series.)

In his foreword Mr. Lindsay assures the reader of his intention not to disregard the warning of Schopenhauer: "Let no one *tell* you what is contained in the 'Critique of Pure Reason.' " His purpose, therefore, is simply to state the problems which drove Kant to think out a solution, and to offer a few suggestions which may help those who read Kant himself, to understand that solution. This would certainly be the kind of introduction to any philosopher that an active mind would welcome. No matter how little previous training a man may have had, if he has philosophic curiosity, it is enough to draw his attention to any of the vital problems of metaphysics: henceforward that problem will torment him, and if he is told that Kant has solved it, he will read Kant. The philosophy books in the People's Series are, presumably, aimed at such minds. But unfortunately, Mr. Lindsay knows too much about Kant's solution to be able to confine himself to the bare statement of the problem: when he has stated the difficulty, he cannot resist sketching the answer. Without such a sketch it would, of course, be hard to find a place for the suggestions which are to help those who read Kant to understand him better, and in the course of this book Mr. Lindsay gives some very helpful explanations of what is essential to Kant's position, distinguishing it from what is merely the result of the deposit of previous philosophies, taken over uncritically. Thus he explains that it does not matter to Kant's argument what type of idealism is assumed: either form of it will fit in equally well with the new position that he wants to establish. From this it follows that many inconsistencies in Kant's account of idealism, which seem at first upsetting, may

be dismissed as irrelevant to the main position. This would certainly save much trouble for those reading Kant for this first time. Again, Mr. Lindsay's explanation of the importance of synthetic *a priori* judgments would certainly help a beginner to see the vital importance of what must otherwise appear a very remote and technical problem. Whenever Mr. Lindsay allows himself to explain rather than merely to condense, his book is of great interest, but we may perhaps regret that he has felt it necessary to undertake the practically impossible task of giving a resumé of Kant's thought as well as commenting on it. The book itself is so short that such an attempt must necessarily occupy almost the whole of it, leaving very little room for the statement of the difficulties which called for the solution, and although it is as clear as so short a summary can hope to be, and contains much that would be interesting to those who were already familiar with Kant, one cannot help wondering whether it would really be very serviceable to non-philosophers.

Mr. Lindsay has produced a book of much scholarly merit, but as an introduction to Kant for those who have not yet read him, it cannot be regarded as a success.

KARIN COSTELLOE.

London, England.

THE MEANING OF CHRISTIANITY. Second Edition, Revised. By Frederick A. M. Spencer, M.A. London and Leipzig: T. Fisher Unwin, 1914. Pp. 350.

Mr. Spencer seeks to present in a modern guise the essentials of the Christian religion, and, it may be added, of Christian theology. One of the merits of the book is its refusal to pander to the popular taste for what is vague and unsystematic by excluding the theological element from Christianity. In Mr. Spencer's free reproduction of Christian doctrine he is not afraid to jettison much that has generally been regarded as essential. He often carries destructive criticism too far. This, I think, seriously weakens his Christology. So far as the constructive part of his work goes, I cannot see that the liberal patches of Positivism and Psychical Research in any way improve the old garment. But it is quite unnecessary to agree